Side-Channel-Free Quantum Key Distribution
Side-Channel-Free Quantum Key Distribution
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DOI：
10.1103/physrevlett.108.130502
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发表时间：
2012-03-30
影响因子：
8.6
通讯作者：
Pirandola, Stefano
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Braunstein, Samuel L.;Pirandola, Stefano
量子密钥分发（QKD）提供了绝对安全通信的承诺。然而，绝对安全的证明往往假设从理论到实验的完美实现。因此，现有的系统可能容易受到依赖于实验实现中的缺陷的阴险的侧信道攻击。在这里，我们将QKD协议中的所有真实的信道替换为虚拟信道，使私有空间内的相关检测器和设置无法访问，同时充当希尔伯特空间滤波器以消除侧信道攻击。通过使用量子存储器，我们发现我们能够通过在分布式状态上计算的纠缠蒸馏率来限制秘密密钥率。
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers the promise of absolutely secure communications. However, proofs of absolute security often assume perfect implementation from theory to experiment. Thus, existing systems may be prone to insidious side-channel attacks that rely on flaws in experimental implementation. Here we replace all real channels with virtual channels in a QKD protocol, making the relevant detectors and settings inside private spaces inaccessible while simultaneously acting as a Hilbert space filter to eliminate side-channel attacks. By using a quantum memory we find that we are able to bound the secret-key rate below by the entanglement-distillation rate computed over the distributed states.