AFFECT AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL PRIMITIVE

AFFECT AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL PRIMITIVE
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DOI:
10.1016/s0065-2601(08)00404-8
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发表时间:
2009-01-01
期刊:
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOL 41
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Bliss-Moreau, Eliza
Bliss-Moreau, Eliza
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Barrett, Lisa Feldman;Bliss-Moreau, Eliza

文献摘要

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在这篇文章中,我们讨论的假设,影响是一个基本的,心理学上不可约的属性的人类心灵。我们开始提出历史观点的性质影响。接下来,我们继续讨论核心情感作为一种基本的心理属性,在广泛分布的神经元工作空间中实现。然后,我们提出的情感环,数学形式化表示核心情感状态,并表明,该模型可用于表示与有意义的变化,在情感体验的核心情感感受的个体差异。最后,我们得出的结论是,核心情感会产生超出情感界限的心理后果,影响学习和意识。
In this article, we discuss the hypothesis that affect is a fundamental, psychologically irreducible property of the human mind. We begin by presenting historical perspectives on the nature of affect. Next, we proceed with a more contemporary discussion of core affect as a basic property of the mind that is realized within a broadly distributed neuronal workspace. We then present the affective circumplex, a mathematical formalization for representing core affective states, and show that this model can be used to represent individual differences in core affective feelings that are linked to meaningful variation in emotional experience. Finally, we conclude by suggesting that core affect has psychological consequences that reach beyond the boundaries of emotion, to influence learning and consciousness.