Explanatory Pluralism in Cognitive Science
Explanatory Pluralism in Cognitive Science
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01042.x
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发表时间：
2009-07-01
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
Chemero, Anthony
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dale, Rick;Dietrich, Eric;Chemero, Anthony
这篇简短的评论有三个目的。第一种是认为认知科学中的“框架之争”是无法解决的。一个理论或框架可以单独解释认知过程的巨大复杂性和多样性的想法似乎不太可能，如果不是不可能的话。第二个目标是由此产生的：我们应该考虑在不同的调查背景下，不同的理论是如何协同工作的。最后的目标是为读者提供一个简短的回顾，他们被这些观点所驱使，去探索关于这个主题的现有文献。尽管有这些文献，多元主义却很少得到更广泛的认知科学的关注。最后，我们简要地考虑一下这对理论认知科学可能意味着什么。
This brief commentary has three goals. The first is to argue that "framework debate" in cognitive science is unresolvable. The idea that one theory or framework can singly account for the vast complexity and variety of cognitive processes seems unlikely if not impossible. The second goal is a consequence of this: We should consider how the various theories on offer work together in diverse contexts of investigation. A final goal is to supply a brief review for readers who are compelled by these points to explore existing literature on the topic. Despite this literature, pluralism has garnered very little attention from broader cognitive science. We end by briefly considering what it might mean for theoretical cognitive science.