Hyperbolic discounting and state‐dependent commitment
Hyperbolic discounting and state‐dependent commitment
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DOI：
10.1111/ecca.12507
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发表时间：
2023-12
期刊：
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Takayuki Ogawa;Hiroaki Ohno
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Takayuki Ogawa;Hiroaki Ohno
在具有不可保险禀赋风险的随机经济中，我们建立了一个条件，在该条件下，双曲线贴现消费者使用非流动资产和借贷限制作为承诺工具来承诺未来的消费路径。有可能采用依赖于国家的承诺作为均衡消费策略。在一条导致未来禀赋较低的道路上，当前的自己可以致力于自己的最优消费路径，这对于未来的自己来说是不可取的。相比之下，沿着未来禀赋较高的道路，当前的自己无法做出承诺，必须接受未来的自己将修改的消费分配。因此，根据出现的随机状态，人们无法在危险情况下充分利用可用的承诺设备。
In a stochastic economy with uninsurable endowment risk, we establish a condition under which hyperbolic‐discounting consumers commit to a future consumption path using both illiquid assets and borrowing constraints as commitment devices. There is the possibility that a state‐dependent commitment can be adopted as an equilibrium consumption strategy. On a path leading to low future endowment, the current self can commit to its own optimal consumption path, which is undesirable for future selves. In contrast, along the path with a high future endowment, the current self cannot make a commitment and must accept a consumption allocation that future selves will revise. Thus, depending on what stochastic state will arise, people cannot fully utilize the available commitment devices in risky situations.