Self-deception in an evolutionary game
Self-deception in an evolutionary game
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DOI：
10.1006/jtbi.2001.2390
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发表时间：
2001-10-21
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Kurland, JA
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Byrne, CC;Kurland, JA
从哲学的角度来看，人类对自己撒谎的想法似乎是不合理和不适应的，如果可能的话。然而，认知模块性范式承认自我欺骗的可能性。特里弗斯认为，自我欺骗可以通过提高人际欺骗的有效性来提高适应性。拉玛钱德朗批评了特里弗斯的猜想，认为自欺的代价超过了它的好处。首先，我们修改了一个著名的认知模块模型明斯基的形式化的认知模型的自欺。然后，我们使用Byrne的多维动态字符元模型整合到一个进化的鹰鸽游戏的认知模型，以调查Trivers和Ramachandran的布局。通过将游戏环境的影响映射到认知状态，并将多个认知模块的影响映射到玩家决策，我们将自我欺骗的认知定义扩展为自我欺骗的行为定义。我们的认知模块，被称为饥饿和恐惧守护进程，评估竞争的利益和成本，并产生玩家的信念。守护进程对遭遇战收益和代价的评估可能会导致守护进程间的冲突，也就是说，关于是否战斗的矛盾心理。玩家类型在解决这种后台进程间冲突的方式上各不相同，并且各种自欺被建模为特定类型的冲突解决机制。在游戏的展示阶段，玩家们互相发出信号，更新他们的信念，然后最终做出决定（鹰或鸽子）。自我欺骗可以影响玩家的信念，从而影响玩家的行为，在信号之前或之后。为了支持特里弗斯猜想，自欺类型的人确实比非自欺类型的人表现得更好。我们分析了这一结果的敏感性的认知模型的参数，特别是认知分辨率的球员和球员信号对合作球员的信念的影响。(C)北京：科学出版社.
From the perspective of philosophy, the idea of humans lying to themselves seems irrational and maladaptive, if even possible. However, the paradigm of cognitive modularity admits the possibility of self-deception. Trivers argues that self-deception can increase fitness by improving the effectiveness of inter-personal deception. Ramachandran criticizes Trivers' conjecture, arguing that the costs of self-deception outweigh its benefits. We first modify a well-known cognitive modularity model of Minsky to formalize a cognitive model of self-deception. We then use Byrne's multi-dimensional dynamic character meta-model to integrate the cognitive model into an evolutionary hawk-dove game in order to investigate Trivers' and Ramachandran's conjectures. By mapping the influence of game circumstances into cognitive states, and mapping the influence of multiple cognitive modules into player decisions, our cognitive definition of self-deception is extended to a behavioral definition of self-deception. Our cognitive modules, referred to as the hunger and fear daemons, assess the benefits and the cost of competition and generate player beliefs. Daemon-assessment of encounter benefits and costs may lead to inter-daemonic conflict, that is, ambivalence, about whether or not to fight. Player-types vary in the manner by which such inter-daemonic conflict is resolved, and varieties of self-deception are modeled as type-specific conflict-resolution mechanisms. In the display phase of the game, players signal to one another and update their beliefs before finally committing to a decision (hawk or dove). Self-deception can affect player beliefs, and hence player actions, before or after signaling. In support of Trivers' conjecture, the self-deceiving types do outperform the non-self-deceiving type. We analyse the sensitivity of this result to parameters of the cognitive model, specifically the cognitive resolution of the players and the influence of player signals on co-player beliefs. (C) 2001 Academic Press.