Sustained cooperation by running away from bad behavior.
Sustained cooperation by running away from bad behavior.
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DOI：
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.05.003
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发表时间：
2016-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Helbing D
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Efferson C;Roca CP;Vogt S;Helbing D
为了合作的发展，某种机制必须限制合作者暴露于背叛者的速度。只有这样，相互合作的好处才能超过被剥削的代价。尽管研究人员普遍同意这一点，但他们对哪种进化机制可以解释人类所表现出的非凡合作存在强烈分歧。许多争议源于对信息规律性的分歧，这种规律性使合作者能够避免背叛者。可靠的信息可以使合作的个人避免被剥削，但何种机制可以维持这种情况是一个有很大争议的问题。我们进行了一个行为实验，看看合作者是否能在有限的明确信息下避免背叛者。我们给每个参与者一个简单的选择，让他们在任何时候离开她现在的社区。参与者不能被识别为个体，他们不能跟踪彼此的行为或多或少的合作倾向。更广泛地说，参与者不知道如果她搬家，她可能会遇到什么行为，所以关于剥削风险的信息非常有限。尽管如此，我们的研究结果表明，仅仅提供移动选项就可以让合作持续很长一段时间。我们的研究结果进一步表明，运动，即使它涉及到相当大的不确定性，允许潜在的合作者进行积极的协调，并消除平均任何个人的回报与合作的劣势。这表明，即使在信息有限的情况下，选择迁移也可以完全重组与合作演变相关的选择性力量的组合。
For cooperation to evolve, some mechanism must limit the rate at which cooperators are exposed to defectors. Only then can the advantages of mutual cooperation outweigh the costs of being exploited. Although researchers widely agree on this, they disagree intensely about which evolutionary mechanisms can explain the extraordinary cooperation exhibited by humans. Much of the controversy follows from disagreements about the informational regularity that allows cooperators to avoid defectors. Reliable information can allow cooperative individuals to avoid exploitation, but which mechanisms can sustain such a situation is a matter of considerable dispute. We conducted a behavioral experiment to see if cooperators could avoid defectors when provided with limited amounts of explicit information. We gave each participant the simple option to move away from her current neighborhood at any time. Participants were not identifiable as individuals, and they could not track each other's tendency to behave more or less cooperatively. More broadly, a participant had no information about the behavior she was likely to encounter if she moved, and so information about the risk of exploitation was extremely limited. Nonetheless, our results show that simply providing the option to move allowed cooperation to persist for a long period of time. Our results further show that movement, even though it involved considerable uncertainty, allowed would-be cooperators to assort positively and eliminate on average any individual payoff disadvantage associated with cooperation. This suggests that choosing to move, even under limited information, can completely reorganize the mix of selective forces relevant for the evolution of cooperation.