Alliance Formation and War
Alliance Formation and War
复制标题
联盟的形成和战争
DOI：
10.2307/2600800
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发表时间：
1995
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Alastair Smith
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Alastair Smith
本文提出了一个联盟形成与战争的博弈模型。该模型研究了联盟如何影响国家行为。联盟文献的几个方面同时纳入该模型中。该模型将联盟的可靠性、联盟对战争发生的影响以及联盟的形成等问题内生化。结果解释了几个经验现象。虽然联盟的形成对国家行为的影响是可以预测的，但联盟对战争发生的总体影响是模糊的。在某些情况下，联盟会增加战争的可能性;在另一些情况下，联盟会减少战争的可能性。联盟的可靠性影响着国家的行为。拥有不可靠联盟的国家比拥有可靠联盟的国家更容易受到攻击。我将讨论这种抽样如何影响联盟可靠性的经验估计。
This article provides a game-theoretic model of alliance formation and war. The model examines how alliances affect the behavior of states. Several aspects of the alliance literature are simultaneously incorporated into the model. The model endogenizes alliance reliability, the effect of alliance on the occurrence of war, and alliance formation. The results explain several empirical phenomena. Although alliance formation has predictable effects on the behavior of nations, the aggregate effect of alliances on the occurrence of war is ambiguous. Under some circumstances alliances increase the probability of war; in others, alliances reduce the likelihood of war. Alliance reliability affects the behavior of nations. Nations with unreliable alliances are more likely to be attacked than those with reliable alliances. I discuss how this sampling affects empirical estimates of alliance reliability.