*Competitive Innovation with Codified and Tacit Knowledge
*Competitive Innovation with Codified and Tacit Knowledge
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*通过编码和隐性知识进行竞争创新
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9485.2009.00491.x
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Tetsugen Haruyama
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Tetsugen Haruyama
以研发为基础的内生技术进步模型的前提是，技术进步是由追求利润的企业家驱动的。这些文献导致了一种主流观点，即内生技术进步与规模报酬不变的完全竞争不一致。从这个占主导地位的角度出发，我们证明，技术进步内生地发生在一个完全竞争的经济下，规模报酬不变的竞争性投入。我们的研究结果是基于一个假设，即R&D创造的共同产品的编纂和隐性知识。实证和案例研究进行了讨论，以支持这一假设。使用该模型，我们证明，更强的专利保护可以鼓励或阻止研发，这取决于经济规模。
R&D-based models of endogenous technical progress rest on a premise that technical progress is driven by profit-seeking entrepreneurs. This literature led to a dominant view that endogenous technical advance is not consistent with perfect competition with constant returns to scale. Departing from this dominant perspective, we demonstrate that technical progress endogenously occurs in a perfectly competitive economy under constant returns to scale in rivalrous inputs. Our result is based on a hypothesis that R&D creates codified and tacit knowledge as joint products. Empirical and case studies are discussed to support the hypothesis. Using the model, we demonstrate that stronger patent protection can encourage or discourage R&D, depending on the size of an economy.