LEARNING, LOCAL INTERACTION, AND COORDINATION
LEARNING, LOCAL INTERACTION, AND COORDINATION
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DOI：
10.2307/2951493
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发表时间：
1993-09-01
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
ELLISON, G
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
ELLISON, G
本文讨论了在一个大的人口协调游戏中学习的动态含义，侧重于结构的匹配过程，描述了球员如何满足。正如在Kandori，Mailath和Rob（1993）中一样，实验和近视的结合创造了“进化”力量，导致参与者在风险主导均衡上进行协调。为了描述有限时间范围内的游戏，有必要考虑动态系统收敛的速率。在具有均匀匹配的大种群中，游戏很大程度上取决于历史因素。相比之下，当玩家与一小群邻居互动时，更合理的假设是进化力量可能决定结果。
This paper discusses the dynamic implications of learning in a large population coordination game, focusing on the structure of the matching process which describes how players meet. As in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) a combination of experimentation and myopia creates ''evolutionary'' forces which lead players to coordinate on the risk dominant equilibrium. To describe play with finite time horizons it is necessary to consider the rates at which the dynamic systems converge. In large populations with uniform matching, play is determined largely by historical factors. In contrast, when players interact with small sets of neighbors it is more reasonable to assume that evolutionary forces may determine the outcome.