OPTIMAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN AUCTIONS
OPTIMAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN AUCTIONS
复制标题
拍卖中的最佳信息披露
DOI：
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Constantine S. Sorokin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Bergemann;T. Heumann;S. Morris;Constantine S. Sorokin
我们刻画了第二价格拍卖中收益最大化的信息结构。卖方面临着一个经典的经济权衡：提供更多的信息提高了分配的效率，但也为投标人创造了更高的信息租金。使卖方收益最大化的信息披露政策是充分揭示低价值（竞争将很高），但集中高价值（竞争将很低）。池的大小由一个关键分位数决定，该分位数独立于价值的分布，仅取决于投标人的数量。我们将讨论这一政策如何为数字广告中的合并提供理论基础。凝胶分类：D44，D47，D83，D84。我们感谢NSF赠款SES-2001208、SES-1948336和SES-2049744以及ANID Fondecyt Iniciacion 11200365的财政支持。我们感谢客座编辑Andy Skrzypacz和三位匿名推荐人提供的有用建议。我们感谢Steve Berry、奥赞坎多根、Roberto Corrao、Phil Haile、Sergiu哈特、Jason Hartline、Nicole Immorlica、Maxim Ivanov、Anton Kolotilin、Renato Paes莱梅、Denis Shishkin、Rann Smorodinsky、Philipp Strack、Alex Wolitzky和Song Zuo进行了内容丰富的讨论。我们感谢Informs AMD、UCSD、PUC Chile、哈佛-麻省理工学院、希伯来大学、计量经济学会中国会议和斯托尼布鲁克国际博弈论会议的与会者提供了许多有益的意见。这份手稿结合并包含了Bergemann，Heumann和Morris（2021）以及Sorokin和Winter（2021）的结果。这两篇论文共享了当前的定理1，通过不同的证明策略获得。[2]耶鲁大学，dirk. bergemann@yale.edu。智利天主教大学，tibor.heumann@uc.cl.马萨诸塞州理工学院，semorris@mit.edu;格拉斯哥大学和高等经济学院，constantine. glasgow.ac.uk;耶路撒冷希伯来大学;和兰开斯特大学，eyal. mail.huji.ac.il
We characterize the revenue-maximizing information structure in the second price auction. The seller faces a classic economic trade-off: providing more information improves the effi ciency of the allocation but also creates higher information rents for bidders. The information disclosure policy that maximizes the revenue of the seller is to fully reveal low values (where competition will be high) but to pool high values (where competition will be low). The size of the pool is determined by a critical quantile that is independent of the distribution of values and only dependent on the number of bidders. We discuss how this policy provides a rationale for conflation in digital advertising. Jel Classification: D44, D47, D83, D84. ∗We acknowledge financial support from NSF grants SES-2001208, SES-1948336 and SES-2049744, and ANID Fondecyt Iniciacion 11200365. We thank the guest editor, Andy Skrzypacz and three anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. We thank Steve Berry, Ozan Candogan, Roberto Corrao, Phil Haile, Sergiu Hart, Jason Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Maxim Ivanov, Anton Kolotilin, Renato Paes Leme, Denis Shishkin, Rann Smorodinsky, Philipp Strack, Alex Wolitzky and Song Zuo for informative discussions. We thank seminar audiences at Informs AMD, UCSD, PUC Chile, Harvard-MIT, Hebrew University , the China Meetings of the Econometric Society and the Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory for many helpful comments. This manuscript combines and subsumes the results in Bergemann, Heumann and Morris (2021) and Sorokin and Winter (2021). These two papers shared the current Theorem 1, obtained via different proof strategies. †Yale University, dirk.bergemann@yale.edu. ‡Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, tibor.heumann@uc.cl. §Massachusetts Institute of Technology, semorris@mit.edu ¶Glasgow University and Higher School of Economics, constantine.sorokin@glasgow.ac.uk ‖The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; and Lancaster University, eyal.winter@mail.huji.ac.il