Income Risk, the Tax-benefit System and the Demand for Children
Income Risk, the Tax-benefit System and the Demand for Children
复制标题
收入风险、税收优惠制度和对儿童的需求
DOI：
10.1111/1468-0335.00236
复制
发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Clive D. Fraser
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Clive D. Fraser
因为孩子代表着不可逆转的承诺，父母可能会通过少生孩子来对冲更高的收入风险。我们表明，在看似合理的假设下，最近收入风险的增加可能降低了谨慎的父母希望的生育能力。考虑了通过税收优惠制度对此作出的反应。在比例税制下引入预期的收入中性转移加子女福利制度，让政府分担家庭的收入风险，增加了在该制度缺失的情况下选择生育小家庭的父母的期望生育率。以英镑换英镑，有针对性的儿童福利比一次性转移更能提高生育率。伦敦政治经济学院版权所有2001年
Because children represent an irreversible commitment, parents might hedge against higher income risk by having fewer children. We show that, under plausible assumptions, recent increases in income risk might have reduced prudent parents' desired fertility. Responses to this via the tax-benefit system are considered. Introducing an expected revenue-neutral transfer-cum-child-benefit system under proportional taxation, which lets the government share the household's income risk, increases desired fertility for parents who would choose to have small families in this system's absence. Pound for pound, the targeted child benefit enhances fertility more than the lump-sum transfer. Copyright 2001 by The London School of Economics and Political Science