Seizing the Contested Terrain of Early Nuclear History: Stimson, Conant, and Their Allies Explain the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb
Seizing the Contested Terrain of Early Nuclear History: Stimson, Conant, and Their Allies Explain the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb
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占领早期核历史的争议地带:史汀生、科南特和他们的盟友解释使用原子弹的决定
DOI:
10.1111/j.1467-7709.1993.tb00158.x
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发表时间:
1993
影响因子:
0.4
通讯作者:
B. Bernstein
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
B. Bernstein
In the late autumn and early winter of 1946-47, more than a year after the atomic bombings of Japan, as the Baruch Plan for international control of atomic energy was going down to defeat in the nascent United Nations, two influential articles appeared in respected national magazines justifying the 1945 attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the December 1946 Atlantic Monthly, physicist Karl T. Compton. MIT’s president and a wartime atomicenergy adviser, published “If the Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Used.” Two months later, in February 1947, a more extended treatment of the issues appeared in Harper’s Magazine as ‘The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,” under the authorship of Henry L. Stimson, the wartime secretary of war who had helped to guide America’s use of the two bombs.’Despite differences in emphasis and length, these two articles seemed deeply informed, honest and open, and generally persuasive. They were ventures by respected Americans to examine the wartime use of the bombs, to describe the care and considerations leading to those decisions, to explain why alternatives would not have worked and were rejected, and to show that the bombings had been necessary to end the Pacific war and save lives. Appearing