The Collapse of Logical Pluralism has been Greatly Exaggerated
The Collapse of Logical Pluralism has been Greatly Exaggerated
复制标题
逻辑多元主义的崩溃被过分夸大了
DOI：
10.1007/s10670-016-9841-7
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Colin R. Caret
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Colin R. Caret
根据比尔和雷斯塔尔的逻辑多元论，存在几种不同的逻辑结果关系。一些批评家认为，逻辑多元主义遭受了我所说的崩溃问题：尽管其意图阐明关于逻辑的激进多元主义学说，但这种观点无意中崩溃为逻辑一元论。在本文中，我提出了崩溃问题的情境主义解决方案。这澄清了负责多个逻辑的机制，并且比原始视图更好地处理激励数据。这是所有逻辑多元论者都应该接受的重大改进。
According to the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall, there are several distinct relations of logical consequence. Some critics argue that logical pluralism suffers from what I call the collapse problem: that despite its intention to articulate a radically pluralistic doctrine about logic, the view unintentionally collapses into logical monism. In this paper, I propose a contextualist resolution of the collapse problem. This clarifies the mechanism responsible for a plurality of logics and handles the motivating data better than the original view. It is a major improvement that should be embraced by all logical pluralists.