Muddled Information
Muddled Information
复制标题
混乱的信息
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Florian Ederer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Frankel;Navin Kartik;R. Bénabou;P. Bond;Wouter Dessein;Florian Ederer
我们研究了一个信令模型，其中的代理在两个维度上是异质的。代理人的自然行动是在没有信号担忧的情况下采取的行动。她的游戏能力决定了增加动作的成本。均衡行为会混淆不同维度的信息。随着采取更高行动的动机增加-由于更高的赌注或更易操纵的信号技术-更多关于游戏能力的信息被揭示，而关于自然行动的信息更少。我们探索了一种新的外部性：向更多的观察者展示代理人的行动可能会恶化现有观察者的信息。讨论了在信用评分、学校测试和网络搜索中的应用。
We study a model of signaling in which agents are heterogeneous on two dimensions. An agent’s natural action is the action taken in the absence of signaling concerns. Her gaming ability parameterizes the cost of increasing the action. Equilibrium behavior muddles information across dimensions. As incentives to take higher actions increase—due to higher stakes or more manipulable signaling technology—more information is revealed about gaming ability, and less about natural actions. We explore a new externality: showing agents’ actions to additional observers can worsen information for existing observers. Applications to credit scoring, school testing, and web searching are discussed.