The Regional Roots of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia
The Regional Roots of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia
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俄罗斯选举威权主义的地区根源
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发表时间：
2011
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通讯作者：
G. Golosov
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作者：
G. Golosov
在2005-2007年期间，俄罗斯的政治体制从有时被称为“管理民主”（Balzer 2003）的政治体制转变为一种不同的政治秩序，这种政治体制通过各种操纵手段限制公民的政治选择范围。从理论角度来看，这种转变可以被视为跨越了两种混合政治制度之间的门槛：“有缺陷的民主”和“选举威权主义”（Diamond 2002; Bogaards 2009）。有缺陷的民主，有时被称为选举民主，与成熟的自由民主相比，不会超过选举的最低限度。虽然有能力“让选举正确”，但有缺陷的民主未能将民主宪政的其他重要方面制度化，如法治、政治问责制、官僚诚信和公众审议（Schedler 2002，第37页）。选举（竞争）专制政权的不同之处在于，它们甚至无法达到自由和公平选举的最低标准，但与其他一些专制主义（Linz 2000）不同，非自由选举仍然是政权合法性的主要来源（Levitsky & Way 2002）。与此同时，它们没有履行一项对民主来说更为重要和确实具有决定性意义的职能，即权力的转移。如果发生权力变更，其潜在机制不仅涉及选举，还涉及政治变革的多维过程（Bunce & Wolchik 2010, p. 43; Brownlee 2007）。为了确保其防止此类过程的能力，选举专制主义采用了各种技术，从彻底的欺诈到更复杂的手段，将选举舞台上的所有参与者或多或少地置于行政部门的直接控制之下（Elklit & Svensson 1997）。与当今世界上许多国家发生的情况类似，与过去的“罕见民主”（Pempel 1990）形成对比，俄罗斯的选举威权主义限制结社和言论自由，垄断媒体，并采用不公平的选举做法，在某种程度上剥夺了选举的主要功能，即政治选择和精英流通，并将其降低为合法化和动员支持的工具(Gill 2006; Hassner 2008；《亚欧研究》Vol. 63, No. 4, 2011, 623-639
IN THE PERIOD 2005–2007, RUSSIA’S POLITICAL regime transformed from what had been sometimes referred to as a ‘managed democracy’ (Balzer 2003), a political regime that restrained the scope of citizens’ political choice by a variety of manipulative means, to a different political order. From a theoretical angle, this transition can be viewed as crossing a threshold between two hybrid political regimes: ‘defective democracy’ and ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Diamond 2002; Bogaards 2009). Defective democracy, sometimes referred to as electoral democracy when contrasted to full-fledged liberal democracy, does not go beyond the electoral minimum. While being capable of ‘getting elections right’, defective democracy fails to institutionalise other vital dimensions of democratic constitutionalism, such as the rule of law, political accountability, bureaucratic integrity, and public deliberation (Schedler 2002, p. 37). Electoral (competitive) authoritarian regimes are different in that they fail to meet even minimum standards of free and fair elections, but nonfree elections, unlike in some other varieties of authoritarianism (Linz 2000), remain the principal source of regime legitimacy (Levitsky & Way 2002). At the same time, they do not perform a function that is more important and indeed defining for democracy, the transfer of power. If alteration in power occurs, the underlying mechanisms involve not only elections but rather multidimensional processes of political change (Bunce & Wolchik 2010, p. 43; Brownlee 2007). To ensure its capability for preventing such processes, electoral authoritarianism employs a variety of techniques, from outright fraud to more sophisticated means of placing all actors in the electoral arena under more or less direct control of the executive (Elklit & Svensson 1997). Similarly to what happens today in many countries of the world, and in contrast to the ‘uncommon democracies’ of the past (Pempel 1990), Russia’s electoral authoritarianism restricts the freedoms of association and speech, monopolises the media, and employs unfair electoral practices to an extent that deprives elections of their primary functions of political choice and elite circulation, and reduces them to a mere tool of legitimisation and mobilisation of support (Gill 2006; Hassner 2008; EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES Vol. 63, No. 4, June 2011, 623–639