Provisions for Noncompliance and Treaty Value: A Game Theoretic Perspective
Provisions for Noncompliance and Treaty Value: A Game Theoretic Perspective
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不遵守规定和条约价值：博弈论的视角
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jean
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Catherine C. Langlois;Jean
我们提出了预防不遵守行为的博弈论分析，用于处理违反条约的行为，无论是有意还是无意。博弈论学家已经开发出概率触发方案来处理这种情况。我们分析了子博弈完美触发条款中的争议解决程序，并提出了处理签名违约的替代设计。本文表明，可以通过评估设计使签署方长期接近合作目标的能力来直接比较设计。这一标准使我们能够强调慷慨和纠正争议解决的优点。慷慨可以避免报复，以便各方能够在实施任何报复行动之前达成和解。但如果报复确实发生，受害者惩罚肇事者的成本决定了设计的价值。使用简单的重复囚徒困境框架，我们发现，在大多数情况下，子博弈的完美设计将对受害方补救的关注添加到概率触发方案中内置的慷慨中，会产生更好的条约价值。
We present a game theoretic analysis of the prevention of noncompliance that deals with treaty violations whether they are intentional or not. Game theorists have developed probabilistic trigger schemes to handle such situations. We analyze dispute resolution procedures in subgame perfect trigger terms and suggest alternative designs for the handling of signatory breach. This paper shows that designs can be compared directly by evaluating their ability to keep signatories close to the cooperative goal in the long run. This criterion enables us to highlight the merits of generosity and redress for dispute resolution. Generosity avoids retaliation with certainty so that parties can settle before any retaliatory action is implemented. But if retaliation does come to pass, it is the cost to the victim of punishing the perpetrator that determines a design’s value. Using a simple repeated prisoner’s dilemma framework we find that, in most circumstances, a subgame perfect design that adds concern for the injured party’s redress to the generosity built into a probabilistic trigger scheme yields better treaty value.