Evolution of the Social Contract
Evolution of the Social Contract
复制标题
社会契约的演变
DOI：
10.1017/cbo9781139924825
复制
发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
P. Kitcher
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Brian Skyrms's;P. Kitcher
在这本新版的《社会契约的进化》中，布莱恩·斯凯姆斯用进化博弈论分析了社会契约的起源，并研究了包括正义、沟通、利他主义和讨价还价在内的社会现象。他的书以关于进化和信息传递的新材料为特色，包括博弈论和进化文献的最新发展，介绍并应用了适当的均衡和进化动力学概念，展示了关键问题如何被建模为游戏，并考虑了进化有时支持理性选择，有时不支持理性选择的方式。他讨论的主题包括与邻居讨价还价如何促进资源共享，小社会中最后通牒谈判中行为的多样性，囚徒困境，以及对信号游戏和自发出现的有意义交流的调查。他的书将在科学哲学、社会科学、进化生物学、博弈论和决策论以及政治理论方面引起读者的极大兴趣。
In this new edition of Evolution of the Social Contract, Brian Skyrms uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the genesis of social contracts and investigates social phenomena including justice, communication, altruism, and bargaining. Featuring new material on evolution and information transfer, and including recent developments in game theory and evolution literature, his book introduces and applies appropriate concepts of equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics, showing how key issues can be modeled as games and considering the ways in which evolution sometimes supports, and sometimes does not support, rational choice. He discusses topics including how bargaining with neighbors promotes sharing of resources, the diversity of behavior in ultimatum bargaining in small societies, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and an investigation into signaling games and the spontaneous emergence of meaningful communication. His book will be of great interest to readers in philosophy of science, social science, evolutionary biology, game and decision theory, and political theory.