Price, Capacity and Concession Period Decisions of Pareto-Efficient BOT Contracts with Demand Uncertainty.
Price, Capacity and Concession Period Decisions of Pareto-Efficient BOT Contracts with Demand Uncertainty.
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DOI：
10.1016/j.tre.2013.01.012
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发表时间：
2013-02
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Niu Baozhuang;Jie Zhang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Niu Baozhuang;Jie Zhang
在本文中，我们研究了需求的不确定性对建设-运营-移交（BOT）合同设计的影响，通过优化一个双目标问题，通过三个关键决策：通行费，容量和特许期。我们得出的最优值，并确定公共和私营部门的经济激励。我们发现，最佳的特许期长度和基础设施的服务质量取决于双方的运营成本和谈判能力。在温和的条件下，我们证明了政府将建立一个更大的能力，但收费低于私营部门。此外，在需求不确定的情况下，BOT合同的效率得到了提高.
In this paper, we study the impact of demand uncertainty on the build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract design by optimizing a bi-objective problem via three critical decisions: toll, capacity and concession period. We derive the optimums and identify the public and private sector’s economic incentives. We find that the optimal length of concession period and the service quality of the infrastructure depend on the two parties’ operational costs and negotiation powers. Under mild conditions, we prove that the government will build a larger capacity but charge less than the private sector. Furthermore, the efficiency of BOT contract is improved with demand uncertainty.