A Theory of Content and Other Essays
A Theory of Content and Other Essays
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内容理论和其他论文
DOI:
10.1111/j.1468-0149.1992.tb00681.x
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发表时间:
1992
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Rita Nolan
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Rita Nolan
This collection comprises eleven chapters chronicling the development, since 1984, of Fodor’s Representational Theory of Mind and his Modularity Thesis of Mental Architecture, with a brief introduction that provides theoretical organisation and coherence to the collection. Nine of the essays have been previously published. The centrepiece of the volume is an essay published for the first time here,‘A Theory ofcontent’, given in two chapters that make up one-third of the book.The essays range over a wide spectrum of recent issues and positions advanced about mental representation, evaluated from the perspective that Fodor introduced in The Language of Thought (1975) and has developed in several subsequent volumes, most recently Psychosemantics (1987). That perspective is a Naturalist-Physicalist-Atomist-Individualist theory of meaning and mind that incorporates a Realist treatment of intentions and propositional attitudes, aiming to reconcile a belief/desire psychology with a bold Physicalism via his Representational Theory of Mind. The essays are largely concerned to defend that view against critics, to recommend it over alternative approaches, and to elaborate it in ways that answer plausibly or otherwise escape its critics. In particular, the essays devise ways by which an Atomist account of meaning and perception might parry the criticisms levelled by Holists (such as Burge and Putnam, for instance) against such accounts.