Executive Remuneration and Employee Performance-Related Pay: A Transatlantic Perspective
Executive Remuneration and Employee Performance-Related Pay: A Transatlantic Perspective
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高管薪酬和员工绩效相关薪酬：跨大西洋视角
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kevin J. Murphy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Boeri;C. Lucifora;Kevin J. Murphy
最近的金融危机引发了公众对高管薪酬方案的强烈抗议，并引发了欧洲和美国对高管薪酬进行改革的呼声。当前的争议不是第一次，也不会是最后一次，高管薪酬引发愤怒并导致大西洋两岸的监管。本书对美国和欧洲的首席执行官进行了比较，以追踪高管薪酬的演变、争议以及由此产生的法规。它表明，当前高管薪酬实践的许多特征反映了监管机构对高管薪酬滥用行为的反应所产生的往往是无意的后果，这些滥用行为往往源于相对孤立的事件或情况。监管会产生意想不到的（通常代价高昂的）副作用，而且它往往是由政治议程而不是股东价值驱动的。高管薪酬的改善更有可能来自更强有力的公司治理，而不是通过政府直接干预。该书还探讨了激励计划的影响以及国家内部和国家之间与绩效相关的薪酬模式。它记录了一些经验规律，并讨论了政府是否应该干预以支持激励性薪酬计划的实施。它认为，如果没有基于合理的分析以及与劳工、管理层和政府决策者的广泛讨论，对替代经济情景下对经济的影响进行详细模拟，那么进行改革就没有什么意义。本卷的贡献者包括：Oriana Bandiera、伦敦政治经济学院 Tito Boeri、Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti 和博科尼大学 Alex Bryson、NIESR 和 Cep-LSE Martin J. Conyon、沃顿商学院、宾夕法尼亚大学 Nuno Fernandes、IMD International Miguel A. Ferreira、Universidade Nova de Lisboa Richard Freeman、哈佛大学和 Cep-LSE Claudio Lucifora、卡托利卡大学和 IZA Pedro Matos，弗吉尼亚大学 Kevin J. Murphy，南加州大学 Michele Pellizzari，博科尼大学 Virginie Perotin，利兹大学商学院和 ERMES Paris-II John van Reenen，Cep-LSE
The recent financial crisis has created a public outcry over top-executive pay packages and has led to calls for reform of executive pay in Europe and the US. The current controversy is not the first - nor will it be the last - time that executive compensation has sparked outrage and led to regulation on both sides of the Atlantic. This volume compares US and European CEOs to trace the evolution of executive compensation, its controversies and its resulting regulations. It shows that many features of current executive compensation practices reflect the, often-unintended, consequences of regulatory responses to perceived abuses in top-executive pay, which frequently stem from relatively isolated events or situations. Regulation creates unintended (and usually costly) side effects and it is often driven by political agendas rather than shareholder value. Improvements in executive compensation are more likely to come from stronger corporate governance, and not through direct government intervention. The volume also examines the effects of incentive schemes and the patterns of performance related pay both within and across countries. It documents a number of empirical regularities and discusses whether government should intervene to support the implementation of incentive pay schemes. It argues that it makes little sense to undertake reform without detailed simulations of the effect on the economy under alternative economic scenarios, based on sound analysis and extensive discussion with labour, management, and government decision-makers. Contributors to this volume - Oriana Bandiera, London School of Economics Tito Boeri, Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti and Bocconi University Alex Bryson, NIESR and Cep-LSE Martin J. Conyon, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania Nuno Fernandes, IMD International Miguel A. Ferreira, Universidade Nova de Lisboa Richard Freeman, Harvard University and Cep-LSE Claudio Lucifora, Cattolica University and IZA Pedro Matos, University of Virginia Kevin J. Murphy, University of Southern California Michele Pellizzari, Bocconi University Virginie Perotin, Leeds University Business School and ERMES Paris-II John van Reenen, Cep-LSE