Delegation and Agency in International Organizations: Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations: Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory
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国际组织中的授权与代理：无政府状态下的授权：国家、国际组织和委托代理理论
DOI：
10.1017/cbo9780511491368.002
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发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
M. Tierney
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Darren Hawkins;David A. Lake;D. Nielson;M. Tierney
1999年12月，警察向一群抗议西雅图世界贸易组织会议的暴徒发射催泪瓦斯和橡皮子弹。这场和类似的反全球化抗议活动的一个中心主题是，WTO、IMF、世界银行和其他全球机构是“失控的”国际官僚机构，它们执行的是由职业经济学家和其他在这些机构中取得成就的新自由主义者制定的“华盛顿共识”（Stiglitz 2002; Rich 1994）。其他批评者指责这些国际组织是强国的帝国主义工具，为了西方的利益剥削贫穷和弱势国家。虽然他们还没有走上街头，美国保守派，在光谱的另一端，认为这些国际组织未能促进美国的利益（Meltzer Commission Report 1999; Krauthammer 2001）。与此同时，欧洲人抱怨欧盟内部的“民主赤字”（参见Pollack 2003 a：407-14）。随着欧盟扩大其能力并发展到25个成员国，批评者指责欧盟的深化和扩大是由欧盟委员会不负责任的官僚和欧洲法院高度孤立的法官推动的。脱离了选举压力，这些日益强大的欧盟机构据称已经摆脱了民众的控制。2005年6月，法国和荷兰选民通过拒绝拟议的欧盟宪法来报复欧盟领导的一体化项目。
In December 1999, police fired tear gas and rubber bullets into a mob protesting the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle. A central theme of this and similar anti-globalization protests is that the WTO, IMF, World Bank, and other global institutions are “runaway” international bureaucracies implementing a “Washington consensus” formulated by professional economists and other neo-liberals who have made their careers within these agencies (Stiglitz 2002; Rich 1994). Other critics charge that these international organizations (IOs) are imperialist tools of the powerful, exploiting poor and disadvantaged countries for the benefit of the West. Although they have not yet taken to the streets, American conservatives, at the other end of the spectrum, argue that these IOs fail to promote the interests of the United States (Meltzer Commission Report 1999; Krauthammer 2001). Meanwhile, Europeans complain about the “democratic deficit” within the European Union (see Pollack 2003a: 407–14). As the EU expands its competencies and grows to twenty-five members, critics charge that the simultaneous deepening and broadening of the union is driven by unaccountable bureaucrats in the European Commission and the highly insulated judges of the European Court of Justice. Divorced from electoral pressures, these increasingly powerful EU institutions have allegedly escaped popular control. French and Dutch voters retaliated against the Brussels-led integration project by rejecting the proposed EU Constitution in June 2005.