Intellections and Volitions: Ockham’s Voluntarism Reconsidered

Intellections and Volitions: Ockham’s Voluntarism Reconsidered
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智力与意志:重新思考奥卡姆的唯意志论

DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-66634-1_8
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发表时间:
2017
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Sonja Schierbaum
Sonja Schierbaum
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文献类型:
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作者:
Sonja Schierbaum

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正如帕纳乔所说,奥卡姆的意志自由在于相反选择的可能性(Panaccio 2012, 75-93和91)。像奥卡姆这样的唯意志论者通常认为,有必要将相反选择的可能性作为道德责任的先决条件。一个行为人只有在他本可以做而不是他实际做的事情时才对他的行为负有道德责任。然而,这一概念引起了人们的担忧,即它暗示了非理性行为的可能性,因为它暗示了完全没有理由的行为的可能性。我在这篇论文中的目的是要证明奥卡姆有办法满足非理性的反对意见,至少如果这种反对意见认为,可以有自由的,但“随机”的行动选择,这些行动是没有理由的,或者没有目的的,因此,抵制任何解释的尝试。因此,我们应该清楚地看到,这段解读暗示奥卡姆通过允许人类主体建立任何作为目的存在的东西,基本上将理性行为和道德行为分开了。因此,奥卡姆面临的挑战是,如何在此基础上调和理性和道德行为。
Freedom of will for Ockham consists in the possibility of opposite choices, as Panaccio puts it (Panaccio 2012, 75–93 and 91). Voluntarists such as Ockham commonly argue for the need of positing the possibility of opposite choices as a prerequisite for moral responsibility. An agent can be held morally responsible for his action only if he could have done other than he actually did. This conception, however, gives rise to the worry that it implies the very possibility of acting irrationally, insofar as it implies the possibility of acting for no reason at all. My aim in this paper is to show that Ockham has the means to meet the objection of irrationality, at least if this is the objection that there can be free, yet ‘random’ choices of actions that are carried out for no reason, or for no end and thus, resist any attempt of explanation. As a result, it should become clear that this reading implies that Ockham basically splits up rational and moral action by allowing human agents to set up anything which exists as an end. The challenge for Ockham, then, is to show how rational and moral action can be reconciled on this basis.
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影响因子: 3.4
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