Optimal and Game-Theoretic Deployment of Security Investments in Interdependent Assets
Optimal and Game-Theoretic Deployment of Security Investments in Interdependent Assets
复制标题
相互依存资产安全投资的优化和博弈论部署
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-319-47413-7_6
复制
发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Bagchi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Hota;Abraham A. Clements;S. Sundaram;S. Bagchi
我们引入了一个博弈论框架来计算多个防御者的最优和战略性安全投资。每个防御者负责多个资产的安全性，资产之间的相互依赖关系由相互依赖关系图捕获。将单个防御者的最优防御分配问题表述为一个凸优化问题，并建立了多防御者博弈的纯纳什均衡的存在性。我们将提出的框架分别应用于相互依赖的SCADA网络和分布式能源的两个案例研究中。特别地，我们研究了分散的防御分配所造成的效率损失。
We introduce a game-theoretic framework to compute optimal and strategic security investments by multiple defenders. Each defender is responsible for the security of multiple assets, with the interdependencies between the assets captured by an interdependency graph. We formulate the problem of computing the optimal defense allocation by a single defender as a convex optimization problem, and establish the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium of the game between multiple defenders. We apply our proposed framework in two case studies on interdependent SCADA networks and distributed energy resources, respectively. In particular, we investigate the efficiency loss due to decentralized defense allocations.