The epistemic virtues of consistency
The epistemic virtues of consistency
复制标题
一致性的认知优点
作者：
S. Ryan
彩票悖论已被广泛讨论。彩票悖论的标准解决方案是持票人有理由相信每张票都会输，但持票人也有理由相信并非所有的票都会输。如果标准解为真，那么我们得到一个矛盾的结果，即一个人有可能有一组合理的信念，而她知道这些信念是不一致的。在本文中，我认为这个悖论的最佳解决方案是持票人没有理由相信任何一张票都是输家。我的解避免了标准解的矛盾结果。我所捍卫的解决方案被其他哲学家草率地拒绝了，因为它似乎会导致怀疑主义。我为我的解决方案辩护，不受怀疑主义的威胁，并给出两个论据来支持我的结论，即在最初的彩票案例中，持票人没有理由相信他的彩票会输。
The lottery paradox has been discussed widely. The standard solution to the lottery paradox is that a ticket holder is justified in believing each ticket will lose but the ticket holder is also justified in believing not all of the tickets will lose. If the standard solution is true, then we get the paradoxical result that it is possible for a person to have a justified set of beliefs that she knows is inconsistent. In this paper, I argue that the best solution to the paradox is that a ticket holder is not justified in believing any of the tickets are losers. My solution avoids the paradoxical result of the standard solution. The solution I defend has been hastily rejected by other philosophers because it appears to lead to skepticism. I defend my solution from the threat of skepticism and give two arguments in favor of my conclusion that the ticket holder in the original lottery case is not justified in believing that his ticket will lose.