A hybrid strategy for cryptanalysis of optical encryption based on double-random phase–amplitude encoding
A hybrid strategy for cryptanalysis of optical encryption based on double-random phase–amplitude encoding
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DOI：
10.1016/j.optlastec.2012.01.021
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发表时间：
2012-07
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
W. He;Xiang Peng;Xiangfeng Meng
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
W. He;Xiang Peng;Xiangfeng Meng
提出了一种结合选择明文攻击（CPA）和已知明文攻击（KPA）算法的混合两步攻击方案，以获取基于双随机相位幅度编码（DRPAE）技术的光密码系统的秘密密钥。通过实施我们提出的攻击，对手不仅可以获得两个随机相位密钥的估计解，还可以获得幅度调制器（AM）的精确解，该解被引入到加密过程中并被视为增强基于DRPAE的密码系统的安全级别的附加密钥。从理论上分析了该攻击策略的有效性和有效性，并通过计算机仿真进行了验证。
A hybrid two-step attack scheme that combines the chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) and the known-plaintext attack (KPA) algorithms is proposed to acquire the secret keys of the optical cryptosystem based on double-random phase–amplitude encoding (DRPAE) technique. By implementing our presented attack, an opponent can obtain not only the estimated solutions of the two random phase keys but also the accurate solution of the amplitude modulator (AM), which is introduced to the encryption process and regarded as an additional key to enhance the security level of the DRPAE-based cryptosystem. The validity and effectiveness of this attack strategy is analyzed theoretically and then verified by computer simulations.