Environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology:: Will the true ranking please stand up?
Environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology:: Will the true ranking please stand up?
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DOI：
10.1016/s0014-2921(02)00188-5
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发表时间：
2003-02
影响因子：
2.8
通讯作者：
T. Requate;Wolfram Unold
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Requate;Wolfram Unold
我们通过环境政策工具研究采用先进减排技术的激励措施。首先，我们研究了监管机构对政策层面做出长期承诺，并且不预期新技术到来的情况。我们表明，税收比许可证提供更强的激励，拍卖和免费许可证提供相同的激励，标准可能比许可证提供更强的激励。其次，我们调查监管机构预期新技术的情况。我们表明，与税收和许可证的监管机构可以诱导第一个最好的结果，如果他的动作后，公司已经投资，而这并不总是举行，如果他先移动。
We investigate incentives through environmental policy instruments to adopt advanced abatement technology. First, we study the case where the regulator makes long-term commitments to policy levels and does not anticipate arrival of new technology. We show that taxes provide stronger incentives than permits, auctioned and free permits offer identical incentives, and standards may give stronger incentives than permits. Second, we investigate scenarios where the regulator anticipates new technologies. We show that with taxes and permits the regulator can induce first-best outcomes if he moves after firms have invested, whereas this does not always hold if he moves first.