Bertrand Competition under Network Externalities
Bertrand Competition under Network Externalities
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2932582
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发表时间：
2014-05
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Masaki Aoyagi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Masaki Aoyagi
两个卖家进行价格竞争，以吸引位于网络上的买家。任何一个卖家的商品对任何一个买家的价值取决于网络上消费相同商品的邻居的数量。对于消费外部性的一般规范，我们表明，均衡价格等于边际成本当且仅当买方网络是完整的或循环的。当外部性在消费规模上近似线性时，我们确定了其中一个卖家垄断市场或两个卖家分割市场的网络类别。
Two sellers engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network. The value of the good of either seller to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who consume the same good. For a generic specification of consumption externalities, we show that an equilibrium price equals the marginal cost if and only if the buyer network is complete or cyclic. When the externalities are approximately linear in the size of consumption, we identify the classes of networks in which one of the sellers monopolizes the market, or the two sellers segment the market.