The Effects of Corporate Finance on Firm Risk-taking and Performance: Theory and Evidence
The Effects of Corporate Finance on Firm Risk-taking and Performance: Theory and Evidence
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公司财务对公司风险承担和绩效的影响：理论和证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kohei Daido
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Okada;Kohei Daido
一些公司可能会表现出比其他公司更好的经营业绩，因为它们承担的是风险更高的项目：风险和回报之间的权衡。我们开发了一个模型来检验金融合同对企业在更安全(低风险，低回报)和高风险(高风险，高回报)项目之间选择的影响。模型表明，假设一个竞争性的资本市场(即没有垄断力量的融资者)，根据条件，三种类型的金融契约(展期贷款、非展期贷款和新股发行)都可以是均衡契约。虽然公司在使用非展期贷款或新股发行时会承担更可怕的h项目，但公司在使用展期贷款时会承担更安全的h项目。该模型强调了展期贷款(带有被动监控)作为一种潜在的惩戒手段的作用，以抑制公司的风险承担。该模型对一家公司的风险承担及其业绩的决定因素产生了几个预测。该模型的一个关键预测是，银行关系更密切的(风险中性)公司更有可能使用展期贷款并承担GSAFER项目，即使资本市场是可竞争的。我们为模型的预测找到了新的经验支持。
Some firms may exhibit better operating performance than others because they undertake riskier projects: risk-return tradeoff. We develop a model to examine the effects of financial contracts on a firm fs choice between safer (lower risk, lower return) and riskier (higher risk, higher return) projects. The model shows that, assuming a competitive capital market (i.e., financiers with no monopoly power), three types of financial contracts (rollover loans, non-rollover loans, and new share issues) can each be an equilibrium contract, depending on conditions. While firms undertake griskier h projects when using non-rollover loans or new share issues, firms undertake gsafer h projects when using rollover loans. The model emphasizes the role of rollover loans (with passive monitoring) as a potential disciplinary device to suppress a firm fs risk-taking. The model generates several predictions about the determinants of a firm fs risk-taking and its performance. One key prediction of the model is that (risk-neutral) firms with closer bank relationships are more likely to use rollover loans and undertake gsafer h projects, even with a contestable capital market. We find novel empirical support for the model fs predictions.