Strategic Choices in Polygamous Households: Theory and Evidence from Senegal
Strategic Choices in Polygamous Households: Theory and Evidence from Senegal
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一夫多妻制家庭的战略选择：来自塞内加尔的理论和证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. Rossi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Rossi
本文提出了一个战略框架，以考虑在一夫多妻制家庭的生育选择。一个理论模型详细说明了非洲生育率的主要驱动因素，并描述了一个妻子的生育能力如何影响她的共同妻子的行为。它生成预测来测试战略互动。利用塞内加尔家庭调查和人口与健康调查的原始数据，经验性检验表明，儿童是战略性补充。一个妻子提高她的生育率是对另一个妻子提高生育率的回应，因为孩子是对丈夫控制的资源的最佳要求。这一结果是第一个量化的证据，证明了共同妻子之间的生殖竞争。它表明，非洲生育率持续高企不仅反映了妇女对生育缺乏控制，而且反映了她们生育多子女的动机。本文也有助于文献的家庭行为作为少数几个尝试打开黑箱的非核心家庭之一。
This paper proposes a strategic framework to account for fertility choices in polygamous households. A theoretical model specifies the main drivers of fertility in the African context and describes how the fertility of one wife might impact the behavior of her co-wives. It generates predictions to test for strategic interactions. Exploiting original data from a household survey and the Demographic and Health Surveys in Senegal, empirical tests show that children are strategic complements. One wife raises her fertility in response to an increase by the other wife, because children are the best claim to resources controlled by the husband. This result is the first quantitative evidence of a reproductive rivalry between co-wives. It suggests that the sustained high level of fertility in Africa does not merely reect women's lack of control over births, as is often argued, but also their incentives to have many children. This paper also contributes to the literature on household behavior as one of the few attempts to open the black box of non-nuclear families.
异质家庭 对肯尼亚配偶之间信息不对称进行的受试者内测试。
影响因子：
2.2
作者：
Hoel,JessicaB
通讯作者：
Hoel,JessicaB