Shared Tax Sources and Public Expenditures
Shared Tax Sources and Public Expenditures
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共享税收来源和公共支出
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Wrede
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Wrede
本文讨论了联邦中公共职能的具体垂直分配：两级政府共享相同的税收来源和用于提高生产力的公共服务的支出。我们考虑盈余最大化的利维坦政府，它们提供公共服务以增加其潜在的税基。纳什均衡的特点是过度征税和相对于盈余最大化——取决于公共物品是否与整个税基充分互补——公共服务要么供给不足，要么供给过度。还考虑了这些结果在福利和专用税的潜在用途方面的影响。
This paper deals with a specific vertical assignment of public functions in a federation: Two levels of government share both the same tax source and expenditure on a productivity increasing public service. We consider surplus maximizing Leviathan governments which provide public services in order to increase their potential tax base. The Nash equilibrium is characterized by overtaxation and relative to surplus maximization—depending on whether or not the public goods are sufficiently complementary with the entire tax base—either underprovision or overprovision of the public service. The implications of these results, in terms of welfare and potential use for earmarking taxes are also considered.