Ambiguity in Cooperative Signaling
Ambiguity in Cooperative Signaling
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DOI：
10.1086/676652
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发表时间：
2014-07-01
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Santana, Carlos
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Santana, Carlos
在博弈论的信号模型中，进化倾向于完全精确的信号系统，但在自然界中，交流几乎总是不精确的。我认为，对这种差异的标准解释只是部分充分的，我证明了沟通往往是模棱两可的，因为信号发送者利用了上下文敏感性。作为证据，我在信令模型中增加了两点：更复杂的信令策略的成本，以及将信号中的信息与独立信息相结合的能力。对改变后的模型的分析和模拟表明，它导致了进化的预测结果偏向于模糊信号。
In game-theoretic signaling models, evolution tends to favor perfectly precise signaling systems, but in the natural world communication is almost always imprecise. I argue that standard explanations for this discrepancy are only partially sufficient, and I show that communication is often ambiguous because signal senders take advantage of context sensitivity. As evidence, I make two additions to the signaling model: a cost for more complex signaling strategies and the ability to combine information in signals with independent information. Analysis and simulation of the altered model shows that it leads to the predicted outcome of evolution favoring ambiguous signaling.