Essence and Modality
Essence and Modality
复制标题
本质与情态
作者：
E. Zalta
物体x可以通过例证F或由F决定而具有属性F。马利的观点是，每一组属性决定一个抽象对象，但这样一个抽象对象不需要例证决定它的属性。例如，属性“金色”和“山色”决定了一个抽象的物体，它既没有体现这两种属性。这里的直觉是，决定抽象对象的属性是其性质的一部分，并支配着该对象的概念。的确，在马克思看来，抽象对象的本质，除了用来理解抽象对象的那些性质外，再没有别的了。接下来，我们将说一个抽象对象编码属性F，而不是说F决定x。因为编码是拥有属性的一种方式，所以它构成了一种预测。这就是为什么我们引入‘xF’作为预测的原子模式，以表达x编码F的事实。我们严格区分这与传统的预测形式，即x例证了F （'Fx'）。(更一般地说，我们读成‘F’xl…Xn '等于xl…例示或代表关系F”。例如，在这种观点下，夏洛克·福尔摩斯编码了侦探身份、居住在伦敦等属性。这些属性是我们用来理解他的，因此是他本性的一部分，但就目前的观点来看，他并没有例证这些属性。相比之下，他举例说明了虚构、被现代犯罪学家崇拜等属性，以及事物由于抽象而具有的各种属性（下文将详细介绍）。一般来说，虚构的对象会在它们各自的故事中编码赋予它们的属性。举另一类例子，数学对象将在各自的理论中编码赋予它们的数学属性。相比之下，它们体现了抽象、没有质量、没有质感、由欧拉所构想等特性。请注意，通过将编码视为第二种预测模式，普通语言中的预测相对于区分xF和Fx的逻辑变得模棱两可。下面详细描述的抽象对象的主要公理是一个理解原则，它断言了抽象对象存在并编码属性的条件：对于任何可表达条件4（在塔斯基的意义上）满足属性F，存在一个抽象对象，它编码的属性F正好满足。那么，考虑一下可以用Fnl形成的二阶模态语言……xn和xF1作为基，其中其他逻辑概念是（非）、-+ (if-then)、V （every）和D（必然）。在这种语言中，标识不是基本的，而是将在下面为对象和关系定义。语言在《心灵》第115卷中得到进一步加强。459年。July2006吗?Zalta 2006此内容从207.46.13.121下载于2017年7月5日星期三18:02:39 UTC所有内容以http://about.jstor.org/terms为准
object x may have a property F either by exemplifying F or by being determined by F. Mally's idea is that every group of properties determines an abstract object, but that such an abstract object need not exemplify the properties which determine it. For example, the properties goldenness and mountainhood determine an abstract object which exemplifies neither of these two properties. The intuition here is that the properties determining an abstract object are part of its nature and govern the conception of that object. Indeed, for Mally, there is nothing more to the nature of an abstract object than the properties by which it is to be conceived. In what follows, we shall say that an abstract object encodes property F instead of saying that F determines x. Since encoding is a way of having a property, it constitutes a kind of predication. That is why we introduce 'xF' as an atomic mode of predication, to express the fact that x encodes F. We rigorously distinguish this from the traditional form of predication, namely, that x exemplifies F ('Fx'). (More generally, we read 'F'xl ... xn' as xl ... xn exemplify or stand in the relation F".) For example, on this view, Sherlock Holmes encodes the properties of being a detective, living in London, etc. These are the properties by which we conceive of him, and thus are part of his nature, but on the present view, he does not exemplify these properties. He exemplifies, by contrast, properties like being fictional, being admired by modern criminologists, etc., as well as a variety of properties that things have in virtue of being abstract (more on this below). In general, fictional objects will be said to encode the properties attributed to them in their respective stories. To take another class of examples, mathematical objects will encode the mathematical properties attributed to them in their respective theories. By contrast, they exemplify properties like being abstract, not having mass, not having a texture, being conceived by Euler, etc. Note that by thinking of encoding as a second mode of predication, predication in ordinary language becomes ambiguous relative to a logic that distinguishes xF and Fx. The principal axiom for abstract objects, described in more detail below, is a comprehension principle that asserts the conditions under which abstract objects exist and encode properties: for any expressible condition 4 that is satisfiable (in Tarski's sense) by properties F, there exists an abstract object that encodes exactly the properties F satisfying (. Consider, then, the second-order, modal language that can be formed with Fnl ... xn and xF1 as a basis, and where the other logical notions are (not), -+ (if-then), V (every), and D (necessarily). Identity is not primitive in this language, but will instead be defined below for both objects and relations. The language is further enhanced with Mind, Vol. 115 . 459 . July2006 ? Zalta 2006 This content downloaded from 207.46.13.121 on Wed, 05 Jul 2017 18:02:39 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms