Social goods dilemmas in heterogeneous societies
Social goods dilemmas in heterogeneous societies
复制标题
DOI：
10.1038/s41562-020-0881-2
复制
发表时间：
2020-05-25
影响因子：
29.9
通讯作者：
Nowak, Martin A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
McAvoy, Alex;Allen, Benjamin;Nowak, Martin A.
在捐赠博弈、囚徒困境、宽松社会困境和公共物品博弈中均存在亲社会行为。许多研究假设人口结构是同质的，这意味着所有的个体都有相同数量的互动伙伴，或者社会公益是一种特定的类型。在这里，我们探讨了任意空间结构和社会商品的一般进化动力学。我们发现，在异质网络中，一些个体比其他人拥有更多的互动伙伴，可以促进亲社会行为的进化。然而，他们往往将大部分利益积累在少数关系密切的个人手中，而其他许多人则获得低回报或负回报。令人惊讶的是，即使总成本超过总收益，选择也会有利于社会产品的生产者。总之，异质结构有能力强烈促进亲社会行为的出现，但它们也创造了产生巨大不平等的可能性。亲社会行为在自然界中无处不在。这些合作社会的基石可以有多种形式，这取决于潜在的社会利益是如何生产和分配的。在这项研究中，作者表明异质种群可以强烈地促进亲社会行为的进化。然而，这种高效的进化揭示了亲社会行为棘手的一面：它们产生了广泛的财富不平等的可能性，甚至达到了对人口中最贫困人口造成损害的程度。作者提供了一个总体框架，可以用来理解这种有害的亲社会性何时会在人群中出现。这些发现表明，在异质社会中，制度干预往往是维持公平结果的关键。
Prosocial behaviours are encountered in the donation game, the prisoner's dilemma, relaxed social dilemmas and public goods games. Many studies assume that the population structure is homogeneous, meaning that all individuals have the same number of interaction partners or that the social good is of one particular type. Here, we explore general evolutionary dynamics for arbitrary spatial structures and social goods. We find that heterogeneous networks, in which some individuals have many more interaction partners than others, can enhance the evolution of prosocial behaviours. However, they often accumulate most of the benefits in the hands of a few highly connected individuals, while many others receive low or negative payoff. Surprisingly, selection can favour producers of social goods even if the total costs exceed the total benefits. In summary, heterogeneous structures have the ability to strongly promote the emergence of prosocial behaviours, but they also create the possibility of generating large inequality.Prosocial behaviours are ubiquitous in nature. These building blocks of cooperative societies can come in many forms, depending on how the underlying social good is produced and distributed. In this study, the authors show that heterogeneous populations can strongly promote the evolution of prosocial behaviours. However, this efficient evolution reveals a thorny side of prosocial behaviours: they generate the possibility of widespread wealth inequality, even to the point of being a detriment to the poorest in the population. The authors provide a general framework that can be used to understand when this harmful prosociality will emerge in a population. These findings suggest that institutional interventions are often essential for maintaining equitable outcomes in heterogeneous societies.