Explaining the premiums paid for large acquisitions: Evidence of CEO hubris
Explaining the premiums paid for large acquisitions: Evidence of CEO hubris
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DOI：
10.2307/2393810
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发表时间：
1997-03-01
影响因子：
10.4
通讯作者：
Hambrick, DC
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hayward, MLA;Hambrick, DC
这项研究考察了首席执行官的傲慢或夸张的自信在解释一些收购溢价如此之高的原因中所起的作用。在106笔大型收购的样本中，我们发现，CEO傲慢的四个指标与支付的保费规模高度相关：收购公司最近的表现，最近媒体对CEO的赞扬，CEO自我重要性的衡量标准，以及这三个变量的综合因素。当董事会缺乏警惕时，CEO傲慢与溢价之间的关系会进一步加强--当董事会的内部董事比例很高，而CEO也是董事会主席的时候。平均而言，我们发现在收购后获取公司股东财富的过程中出现了损失，CEO的傲慢和收购溢价越大，股东损失就越大。因此，CEO的傲慢除了对战略行为观察者具有潜在的重大理论意义外，还具有实质性的实践后果。
This study examines the role of a chief executive officer's hubris, or exaggerated self-confidence, in explaining the large size of some premiums paid for acquisitions. In a sample of 106 large acquisitions, we found that four indicators of CEO hubris are highly associated with the size of premiums paid: the acquiring company's recent performance, recent media praise for the CEO, a measure of the CEO's self-importance, and a composite factor of these three variables. The relationship between CEO hubris and premiums is further strengthened when board vigilance is lacking -when the board has a high proportion of inside directors and when the CEO is also the board chair. On average, we found losses in acquiring firms' shareholder wealth following an acquisition, and the greater the CEO hubris and acquisition premiums, the greater the shareholder losses. Thus, CEO hubris has substantial practical consequences, in addition to having potentially great theoretical significance to observers of strategic behavior.