The valley of trust: The effect of relational strength on monitoring quality
The valley of trust: The effect of relational strength on monitoring quality
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DOI：
10.1016/j.obhdp.2019.07.004
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发表时间：
2021-09-26
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Iorio, Alessandro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Aven, Brandy;Morse, Lily;Iorio, Alessandro
监管机构对公司的有效监测对于维持经济可持续性、纠正市场中的信息不对称以及减轻社会和环境外部性至关重要。然而，当监测机构未能发现或报告他们监测的公司的违规行为时，往往会出现监测失败。虽然组织学者将薄弱的关系和公司与监管者之间缺乏信任作为监控失败的关键来源，但对组织偏差的研究认为，对强大关系的信任增加会通过疏忽和串通促进监控失败。在这两个文献的基础上，我们提出关系强度与监控质量呈U型关系，由信任起中介作用：关系强度越高，监控失败率越低，超过一定程度，监控失败率就越高。我们通过三项研究验证了我们的理论：使用财务重述纵向档案数据的实地研究，对注册会计师的调查，以及实验性审计模拟。
Effective monitoring of firms by regulatory agencies is essential to maintaining economic sustainability, correcting information asymmetry in markets, and mitigating social and environmental externalities. Yet, monitoring failures often arise where the monitoring agent fails to detect or report infractions by the firms they monitor. Whereas organizational scholars cite weak relationships and a lack of trust between firms and monitors as a key source of monitoring failures, research in organizational deviance contends that increased trust in strong relationships promotes monitoring failures via negligence and collusion. Drawing on these two literatures, we propose that relationship strength exhibits a U-shaped relationship with monitoring quality, as mediated by trust: increasing relationship strength reduces monitoring failures to a certain point, but beyond which it increases monitoring failures. We test our theory with three studies: a field study using longitudinal archival data on financial restatements, a survey of Certified Public Accountants, and an experimental audit simulation.