Does quasi-mandatory dividend rule restrain overinvestment?
Does quasi-mandatory dividend rule restrain overinvestment?
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准强制分红规则能否抑制过度投资？
DOI：
10.1016/j.iref.2018.07.001
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
4.5
通讯作者：
Guo Yunnan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wei Xiaoquan;Wang Chunfei;Guo Yunnan
本文研究了准强制性股利制度对抑制中国公司过度投资的影响。2008年，中国政府通过了一项规定，要求上市公司在申请首次公开募股( )之前，必须支付至少相当于其前3个IPO年度平均收益的30%的现金股息。中国的30%规则是独一无二的，因为它只适用于申请首次公开募股的公司。我们的发现表明，在30%规则之后，支付少量股息(但不符合30%规则)的公司比对照公司更好地抑制了过度投资。30%规则虽然旨在鼓励公司支付更多股息，但也推动小股利公司通过降低过度投资的程度来提高投资效率。对于没有分红的公司，我们发现，在实施30%规则后，他们的过度投资增加了。最后，我们证明，如果小股利公司存在严重的代理问题，30%规则对抑制小股利公司过度投资的影响会减弱。我们的发现为考虑采用强制性股息规定的其他新兴市场提供了政策上的启示。
We study the impact of a quasi-mandatory dividend rule on restraining corporate overinvestment in China. In 2008, the Chinese government adopted a regulation mandating that publicly listed firms pay out a minimum of 30% of their average earnings over the preceding 3 years as cash dividends before the firms can apply for SEOs. The 30% Rule in China is unique in the sense that it applies only to firms applying for SEOs. Our findings suggest that firms paying small dividends (but not meeting the 30% Rule) better restrain their overinvestment after the 30% Rule than the control firms. The 30% Rule, while meant to encourage firms to pay more dividends, pushes small-dividend firms to improve their investment efficiency by lowering the extent of overinvestment. For firms paying no dividends, we find that, after implementation of the 30% Rule, their overinvestment increases. Finally, we document that the impact of the 30% Rule on restraining overinvestment among small-dividend firms is attenuated if they have bad agency problems. Our findings offer policy implications for other emerging markets considering adopting mandatory dividend regulations.