The Principal Principle, admissibility, and normal informal standards of what is reasonable

The Principal Principle, admissibility, and normal informal standards of what is reasonable
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主要原则、可受理性以及合理的正常非正式标准

DOI:
10.1007/s13194-021-00352-x
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发表时间:
2021
影响因子:
1.5
通讯作者:
J. Williamson
J. Williamson
中科院分区:
人文科学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
J. Landes;C. Wallmann;J. Williamson

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本文强调了刘易斯的主要原则和某些辅助条件的作用,作为服务于解释什么是合理的正常的非正式标准。这些考虑激发了霍桑等人(British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,68,123-131,2017)提出的论证的前提假设,即主要原则意味着无差异原则。他们还提出了对最近对这一论点的批评的回应,这是由于Pettigrew(英国科学哲学杂志,71,605-619,2020)和Titelbaum和哈特(英国科学哲学杂志,71(2),621-632,2020)。该论文还表明,哈特和Titelbaum(思想:哲学杂志,4(4),252-262,2015)的相关关注并没有削弱霍桑等人的论点。
This paper highlights the role of Lewis’ Principal Principle and certain auxiliary conditions on admissibility as serving to explicate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. These considerations motivate the presuppositions of the argument that the Principal Principle implies the Principle of Indifference, put forward by Hawthorne et al. (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68, 123–131, 2017). They also suggest a line of response to recent criticisms of that argument, due to Pettigrew (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 71, 605–619, 2020) and Titelbaum and Hart (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 71(2), 621–632, 2020). The paper also shows that related concerns of Hart and Titelbaum (Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 4(4), 252–262, 2015) do not undermine the argument of Hawthorne et al. (2017).
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