Optimal Tax Progressivity: An Analytical Framework
Optimal Tax Progressivity: An Analytical Framework
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DOI：
10.1920/wp.ifs.2014.1427
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发表时间：
2014-02
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Heathcote;Kjetil Storesletten;G. Violante
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Heathcote;Kjetil Storesletten;G. Violante
是什么决定了税收和转移支付制度的最佳累进程度？一方面，累进税制可以抵消初始条件下的不平等，并替代针对特殊收入风险的不完善的私人保险。与此同时，累进性降低了工作和技能投资的动力，并加剧了与有价值的公共支出相关的外部性。我们开发了一个易于处理的均衡模型，其中包含所有这些权衡。我们得出的社会福利分析表达式可以透明地理解偏好、技术和市场结构参数如何影响最佳进步程度。对美国经济的校准表明，内生技能投资、灵活的劳动力供应以及与有价值的政府购买相关的外部性在限制期望的进步性方面发挥着数量上相似的作用。
What shapes the optimal degree of progressivity of the tax and transfer system? On the one hand, a progressive tax system can counteract inequality in initial conditions and substitute for imperfect private insurance against idiosyncratic earnings risk. At the same time, progressivity reduces incentives to work and to invest in skills, and aggravates the externality associated with valued public expenditures. We develop a tractable equilibrium model that features all of these trade-offs. The analytical expressions we derive for social welfare deliver a transparent understanding of how preferences, technology, and market structure parameters influence the optimal degree of progressivity. A calibration for the U.S. economy indicates that endogenous skill investment, flexible labor supply, and the externality linked to valued government purchases play quantitatively similar roles in limiting desired progressivity.