Logic and time
Logic and time
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逻辑与时间
DOI：
10.2307/2273296
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发表时间：
1979
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
J. Burgess
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Burgess
“在时间中，严格的抽象，在时间中，最高的，在时间神圣的知识，是理解的”阿萨瓦吠陀遵循麦克塔格特[17]，我们可以区分两个方面的时间：A系列，贯穿过去到现在，并进入未来，和B系列，从早到晚。至少在印欧语系中，动词是有时态的，所以我们不得不把我们所说的任何东西放在A系列的三个部分之一。但这些分歧并不是永久性的：现在的是未来的，也将是过去的。因此，一个典型的陈述，例如“苏格拉底坐着”，很可能在某个时候是真的，而在另一个时候是假的。真值随时间的不稳定性在文艺复兴前的逻辑学家中是司空见惯的，但大多数现代作家都“抽象”了，即忽略了日常语言的这一特征。早期的逻辑学家对时间很感兴趣：亚里士多德在《论解释》中著名的“海战”段落中质疑了排除中间对未来偶然事件预测的适用性。后来的希腊逻辑学家争论，既不是也不会是的东西是否可以合法地被称为可能的，以及为了使条件句“如果p，那么q”为真，是否要求“不是p和不是q都为真”（不仅仅是现在，而是）总是为真。中世纪西欧的逻辑学家与教会、全知和自由意志的教条所造成的逻辑困难作斗争。他们在伊斯兰世界的同行对时间副词的语义感到困惑，“总是”，“通常”，“经常”，“有时”，“很少”，“从不”。
‘In Time rigorous abstraction, in Time the highest, in Time divine knowledge, is comprehended’ Atharva Veda Following McTaggart [17], we may distinguish two aspects of time: The A-series, running through the past to the present and on into the future, and the B-series, running from earlier to later. In Indo-European languages at least, verbs are tensed, so we cannot help but place whatever we speak of in one of the three divisions of the A-series. But these divisions are not permanent: what is present was future and will be past. Hence a typical statement, e.g. ‘Socrates is sitting’, may well be true at one time and false at another. The instability of truth-value over time was a commonplace among pre-Renaissance logicians, but most modern writers have ‘abstracted from’, i.e. ignored, this feature of ordinary language. Early logicians were quite interested in time: Aristotle questioned the applicability of the excluded middle to predictions of future contingencies in the famous ‘sea-fight’ passage of On interpretation. Later Greek logicians debated whether that which neither is nor will be can legitimately be called possible, and whether, in order for the conditional ‘if p, then q’ to be true, it is required that ‘not both p and not ∼q’ be true (not just now but) always. Mediaeval logicians in Western Europe struggled with logical difficulties created by the Dogmas of the Church, Omniscience and Free Will. Their counterparts in the Islamic world puzzled over the semantics of the temporal adverbs, ‘always’, ‘usually’, ‘often’, ‘sometimes’, ‘seldom’, ‘never’.