Emasculating Public Accountability in the Name of Competition: Transformation of State Audit in Victoria
Emasculating Public Accountability in the Name of Competition: Transformation of State Audit in Victoria
复制标题
以竞争的名义削弱公共责任：维多利亚州国家审计的转型
DOI：
10.1006/cpac.2002.0523
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Guthrie
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
L. English;J. Guthrie
本文概述了导致1998年澳大利亚国家审计机构全面转型的背景过程。维多利亚州审计长办公室的改革表面上是实施制度经济理论的结果，更具体地说，是在公共部门采取竞争政策的承诺。它们导致采用了分段的国家审计模式，在这种模式下，所有的国家审计都是完全有争议的。进行审计的权利从审计长那里被剥夺，并移交给一个法定机构，其主要职能是与私人审计公司竞争对所有政府机构进行所有财务报表和业绩审计。本文探讨了这些改革提出的两个主要问题。首先，它考虑在总审计长不进行审计的制度下，总审计长的公共问责义务是否可以维持。其次，它考察了改革是否可以根据总审计长的低效表现或经济理论的影响来证明是合理的。这篇论文驳斥了竞争政策中所包含的原则是改革国家审计的适当基础的论点。通过对问责制和公共利益考虑的分析、支持政府改革的经济理论的含义，以及拒绝审计长充当垄断供应商的论点的证据，这一结论得到了加强。正如当时广泛争论的那样，该报告的结论是，1998年维多利亚州进行的审计改革是出于政治动机，而非经济动机。
This paper outlines contextural processes that resulted in the comprehensive transformation, in 1998, of a state audit institution in Australia. The reforms to the Victorian Auditor-General's Office were ostensibly an outcome of the implementation of institutional economic theories, and more particularly a commitment to adopt competition policy in the public sector. They resulted in the adoption of a segmented model of state audit in which all state audits were made fully contestable. The right to conduct audits was stripped from the auditor-general and transferred to a statutory body, the principal function of which was to compete with private audit firms for the conduct of all financial statement and performance audits of all government bodies.The paper explores two major issues raised by these reforms. First, it considers whether the public accountability obligations of auditors-general can be maintained under a regime in which auditors-general conduct no audits. Second, it examines whether the reforms can be justified on the basis of the inefficient performance of the auditor-general, or of the implications of economic theory. The paper rejects the contention that principles enshrined in competition policy are an appropriate basis on which to reform state audit. This conclusion is reinforced through analysis of accountability and public interest considerations, the implications of the economic theories underpinning the thrust of the government's reforms, and evidence rejecting the contention that the auditor-general acted as a monopoly supplier. The paper concludes, as widely contended at the time, that the audit reforms undertaken in Victoria in 1998 were politically and not economically motivated.