Less Pay and More Sensitivity? Institutional Investor Heterogeneity and CEO Pay
Less Pay and More Sensitivity? Institutional Investor Heterogeneity and CEO Pay
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更少的报酬和更高的敏感性？
DOI：
10.1177/0149206310372412
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发表时间：
2011
影响因子：
13.5
通讯作者：
Jeongil Seo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Shin;Jeongil Seo
在本文中，作者发展并检验了机构投资者异质性对CEO薪酬影响的理论。他们的理论预测，机构投资者监督CEO薪酬的动机和能力是由机构投资者所面临的受托责任、利益冲突和信息不对称决定的。他们的理论表明，与之前的文献相反，公共养老基金和共同基金对其投资组合公司的首席执行官薪酬产生不同的影响，因为它们没有相同的监督激励和能力。通过对1998年至2002年间标准普尔1500公司的纵向抽样，作者发现公共养老基金的所有权与CEO薪酬水平和CEO绩效薪酬敏感性之间的关系比共同基金的所有权更为负相关——实际上是相反的关系。他们的研究结果表明：(a)研究人员使用机构投资者分类，不区分公共养老基金所有权和共同基金所有权，这可能会产生误导；(b)尽管首席执行官薪酬批评者呼吁制定符合“低薪酬、高敏感度”原则的薪酬计划，但这可能是一个无效的目标。
In this article, the authors develop and test a theory on the effect of institutional investor heterogeneity on CEO pay. Their theory predicts that institutional investors’ incentives and capabilities to monitor CEO pay are determined by the fiduciary responsibilities, conflicts of interest, and information asymmetry that institutional investors face. Their theory suggests, in contrast to previous literature, that public pension funds and mutual funds exert different effects on CEO pay at their portfolio firms because they do not have the same monitoring incentives and capabilities. Using a longitudinal sample of S&P 1500 firms for the years 1998 to 2002, the authors find that public pension fund ownership is more negatively—indeed, oppositely—associated with both the level of CEO pay and CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity than mutual fund ownership. Their findings suggest that (a) researchers’ use of institutional investor classifications that do not distinguish public pension fund ownership and mutual fund ownership can be misleading and (b) while CEO pay critics have called for pay plans that are in line with the “less pay and more sensitivity” principle, this may be an ineffective goal to pursue.