Some design lessons from market-based greenhouse gas regulation in the restructured Australian electricity industry
Some design lessons from market-based greenhouse gas regulation in the restructured Australian electricity industry
复制标题
澳大利亚电力行业重组中基于市场的温室气体监管的一些设计经验教训
DOI：
10.1016/j.enpol.2004.05.009
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Karel Nolles
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
I. MacGill;H. Outhred;Karel Nolles
全球对在电力行业使用基于市场的政策工具进行气候变化监管的兴趣日益浓厚。与更传统的监管方法相比，这些机制似乎提供了一些效率和灵活性优势，同时与竞争性的基于市场的电力行业高度兼容。澳大利亚是电力行业重组和基于市场的环境工具的早期和热情采用者。本文首先概述了最近的一些政策发展。我们特别描述了电力行业重组的目标、设计和迄今为止的成果、强制性可再生能源目标、新南威尔士州温室基准、昆士兰州 13% 天然气计划和政府认可的绿色电力。由此，我们为此类基于市场的工具吸取了一些关键的设计经验。其中包括方案设计中抽象的危险、在“基线和信贷”计划中设定适当基线的至关重要性、此类措施可能以降低其环境有效性的方式相互作用的可能性、具有测量、验证或“额外性”困难的可交易工具的“柠檬市场”风险，以及为这些机制创建透明流动市场的挑战。迄今为止，这些澳大利亚计划的表现好坏参半，说明在设计此类基于市场的方法时需要非常谨慎。
There is growing worldwide interest in the use of market-based policy instruments for climate change regulation in the electricity sector. These mechanisms would seem to offer some efficiency and flexibility advantages over more traditional regulatory approaches, while being highly compatible with competitive market-based electricity industries. Australia has been an early and enthusiastic adopter of both electricity industry restructuring and market-based environmental instruments. This paper first outlines some of these recent policy developments. In particular, we describe the objectives, design and outcomes to date of electricity industry restructuring, the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target, the NSW Greenhouse Benchmarks, the Queensland 13% Gas scheme and Government accredited Green Power. From this, we draw some key design lessons for such market-based instruments. These include the perils of abstraction in scheme design, the vital importance of setting appropriate baselines in ‘baseline and credit’ schemes, the possibility that such measures may interact in ways that reduce their environmental effectiveness, ‘market for lemon’ risks with tradable instruments that have measurement, verification or ‘additionality’ difficulties, and the challenges of creating transparent liquid markets for these mechanisms. The mixed performance of these Australian schemes to date illustrates the need for great care in designing such market-based approaches.