When No Law is Better than a Good Law
When No Law is Better than a Good Law
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.558021
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发表时间：
2009-04
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Utpal Bhattacharya;H. Daouk
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Utpal Bhattacharya;H. Daouk
本文从理论和经验两方面论证了，有时没有一部证券法比一部没有执行的好证券法更好。论文的第一部分正式确定了任何法律都会发生这种情况的充分条件。论文的第二部分表明，一部具体的证券法--禁止内幕交易的法律--可能满足这些条件。论文的第三部分对数据进行了预测。我们发现，当一些国家制定了内幕交易法，但没有执行时，股权成本实际上会上升。
This paper argues, both theoretically and empirically, that sometimes no securities law may be better than a good securities law that is not enforced. The first part of the paper formalizes the sufficient conditions under which this happens for any law. The second part of the paper shows that a specific securities law - the law prohibiting insider trading - may satisfy these conditions. The third part of the paper takes this prediction to the data. We find that the cost of equity actually rises when some countries enact an insider trading law, but do not enforce it.