Belief Manipulation Through Propositional Announcements
Belief Manipulation Through Propositional Announcements
复制标题
通过提案公告操纵信念
DOI：
10.24963/ijcai.2017/154
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Eric Tsang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Aaron Hunter;François Schwarzentruber;Eric Tsang
公开公告会导致群体中的每个智能体修改他们的信念以纳入一些新的信息，同时意识到所有其他智能体也在做同样的事情。给定一组智能体和一组认知目标，很自然地会问是否有一个单一的公告可以让每个智能体相信相应的目标。众所周知，这个问题在一般模态设置中是不可判定的，其中嵌套信念的存在可能导致复杂的动态。在本文中，我们认为在年度股东大会信念修正的背景下，公告不一定是真实的。我们证明了在这种情况下发现的公告不仅是可判定的，而且比最简化的模态逻辑中的相应问题更简单。然后，我们描述了一种实现的工具，该工具使用公告发现来通过信念操纵来控制机器人行为。
Public announcements cause each agent in a group to modify their beliefs to incorporate some new piece of information, while simultaneously being aware that all other agents are doing the same. Given a set of agents and a set of epistemic goals, it is natural to ask if there is a single announcement that will make each agent believe the corresponding goal. This problem is known to be undecidable in a general modal setting, where the presence of nested beliefs can lead to complex dynamics. In this paper, we consider not necessarily truthful public announcements in the setting of AGM belief revision. We prove that announcement finding in this setting is not only decidable, but that it is simpler than the corresponding problem in the most simplified modal logics. We then describe an implemented tool that uses announcement finding to control robot behaviour through belief manipulation.