Time-shift attack in practical quantum cryptosystems
Time-shift attack in practical quantum cryptosystems
复制标题
DOI：
10.26421/qic7.1-2-3
复制
发表时间：
2005-12
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
B. Qi;C. Fung;H. Lo;Xiongfeng Ma
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
B. Qi;C. Fung;H. Lo;Xiongfeng Ma
最近，一种新型的攻击，它利用量子密钥分配（QKD）系统中的两个单光子探测器（SPD）的效率失配，已被提出。在本文中，我们提出了另一种“时移”攻击，利用同样的缺陷。在我们的攻击中，Eve在Alice和Bob之间移动信号脉冲或同步脉冲或两者的到达时间。特别是，在Bob采用时分复用技术以相同SPD检测位“0”和位“1”的QKD系统中，在某些情况下，Eve可以获取最终密钥的完整信息，而不会引入任何错误。此外，我们证明了如果Alice和Bob不知道我们的攻击，他们共享的最终密钥是不安全的。我们强调，我们的攻击是简单和可行的，以目前的技术。最后，我们讨论了一些应对措施，我们和以前的攻击。
Recently, a new type of attack, which exploits the efficiency mismatch of two single photon detectors (SPD) in a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, has been proposed. In this paper, we propose another "time-shift" attack that exploits the same imperfection. In our attack, Eve shifts the arrival time of either the signal pulse or the synchronization pulse or both between Alice and Bob. In particular, in a QKD system where Bob employs time-multiplexing technique to detect both bit "0" and bit "1" with the same SPD, Eve, in some circumstances, could acquire full information on the final key without introducing any error. In addition, we prove that if Alice and Bob are unaware of our attack, the final key they share is insecure. We emphasize that our attack is simple and feasible with current technology. Finally, we discuss some counter measures against our and earlier attacks.