Attack Detection in Sensor Network Target Localization Systems With Quantized Data

Attack Detection in Sensor Network Target Localization Systems With Quantized Data
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DOI:
10.1109/tsp.2018.2802459
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发表时间:
2017-05
影响因子:
5.4
通讯作者:
Jiangfan Zhang;Xiaodong Wang;Rick S. Blum;Lance M. Kaplan
Jiangfan Zhang;Xiaodong Wang;Rick S. Blum;Lance M. Kaplan
中科院分区:
工程技术1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Jiangfan Zhang;Xiaodong Wang;Rick S. Blum;Lance M. Kaplan

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我们考虑一个专注于目标定位的传感器网络,其中传感器测量目标发出的信号强度。每次测量被量化为一位并发送到融合中心。考虑在一些传感器上存在一种通用攻击,该攻击试图使融合中心对目标位置产生不准确的估计。这种攻击是中间人攻击、黑客攻击和欺骗攻击的组合,能够以一种现实的方式有效地改变进出传感器节点的信号。我们表明,攻击的本质影响是在不同程度上改变对目标与每个受攻击传感器之间距离的原始估计(该原始估计忽略了攻击的存在),从而在受攻击和未受攻击的传感器之间产生几何不一致性。借助两个安全传感器,提出了一类检测器,通过仔细检查几何不一致性的存在来检测受攻击的传感器。我们表明,随着测量样本数量的增加,所提出的检测器的误报概率和漏报概率呈指数下降,这意味着有足够的测量样本时,所提出的检测器能够以任何所需的精度识别受攻击和未受攻击的传感器。数值结果表明,与在不检测攻击的情况下使用所有传感器或仅使用安全传感器的情况相比,如果我们使用安全传感器以及被所提出的检测器判定为未受攻击的传感器,定位性能可以得到显著提高。
We consider a sensor network focused on target localization, where sensors measure the signal strength emitted from the target. Each measurement is quantized to one bit and sent to the fusion center. A general attack is considered at some sensors that attempts to cause the fusion center to produce an inaccurate estimation of the target location. The attack is a combination of man-in-the-middle, hacking, and spoofing attacks that can effectively change both signals going into and coming out of the sensor nodes in a realistic manner. We show that the essential effect of attacks is to alter the naive estimate of the distance between the target and each attacked sensor, which ignores the existence of attacks, to a different extent, giving rise to a geometric inconsistency among the attacked and unattacked sensors. With the help of two secure sensors, a class of detectors are proposed to detect the attacked sensors by scrutinizing the existence of the geometric inconsistency. We show that the false alarm and miss probabilities of the proposed detectors decrease exponentially as the number of measurement samples increases, which implies that with sufficient measurement samples, the proposed detectors can identify the attacked and unattacked sensors with any required accuracy. Numerical results show that compared to the cases where all sensors are employed without detecting attacks or only the secure sensors are employed, the localization performance can be significantly improved if we employ the secure sensors and the sensors which are declared as unattacked by the proposed detector.