A game theoretic model for strategic maintenance and dispatch decisions
A game theoretic model for strategic maintenance and dispatch decisions
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DOI：
10.1109/tpwrs.2004.836180
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发表时间：
2004-11
影响因子：
6.6
通讯作者：
D. Chattopadhyay
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Chattopadhyay
寡头垄断市场中的维护决策具有战略意义，因为发电公司通常能够通过容量撤回来操纵市场价格。一个密切相关的问题是从战略上从现有能力中扣除发电量。一个分析框架，使联合评估的维护和发电策略。古诺-纳什均衡（CNE）的概念扩展到跨期决策的维护和发电的多个发电厂。每个发电公司都通过战略性地将其发电能力用于维护，并考虑到竞争对手的决定，从可用容量中扣除发电量，从而最大限度地提高其利润。CNE问题是作为一个连续的，或混合整数，非线性规划优化问题。对偶理论是用来获得的边际利润，发电商可以赚取的增量，在寡头垄断的市场设置。说明性的数值例子CNE的维护和生成策略，这些进行了比较和对比，对一个完全竞争的情况。
Maintenance decisions in an oligopolistic market attains a strategic dimension because gencos are often able to manipulate market prices through capacity withdrawal. A closely related issue is that of strategically withholding generation from available capacity. An analytic framework is presented that enables joint evaluation of maintenance and generation strategies. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium (CNE) concept is extended for intertemporal decision making on maintenance and generation for multiple gencos. Each Genco maximizes its profit by strategically putting its capacity on maintenance as well as withholding generation from available capacity, taking into account its rival gencos decisions. The CNE problem is posed as a continuous, or mixed integer, nonlinear programming optimization problem. Duality theory is employed to derive insights about the marginal profit that a genco may earn from an increment in its availability in an oligopolistic market setup. Illustrative numerical examples are presented of CNE maintenance and generation strategies and these are compared and contrasted against those of a perfectly competitive scenario.