SELLING SPECTRUM RIGHTS
SELLING SPECTRUM RIGHTS
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DOI：
10.1257/jep.8.3.145
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发表时间：
1994-06-01
影响因子：
8.4
通讯作者：
MCMILLAN, J
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
MCMILLAN, J
FCC频谱许可拍卖的设计是一个应用经济学理论的案例研究。拍卖理论有助于解决以下政策问题：应该采用公开拍卖还是密封拍卖？这些许可证是顺序拍卖还是同时拍卖？政府应该允许合并许可证的投标，还是应该只接受单一许可证的投标？拍卖应如何安排，以促进少数人拥有的公司和其他指定公司的利益？政府应该征收特许权使用费还是保留价？竞标者应该被告知多少有关他们竞争的信息？
The design of the FCC spectrum-license auction is a case study in the application of economic theory. Auction theory helped address policy questions such as: Should an open auction or a sealed-bid auction be used? Should the licenses be auctioned sequentially or simultaneously? Should the government allow bids for combinations of licenses, or should it accept only single-license bids? How should the auction be structured to promote the interests of minority-owned and other designated firms? Should the government impose royalties or reserve prices? How much should the bidders be informed about their competition?