For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture
For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture
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金融机构国际监管的多样性：批评和重新调整巴塞尔架构
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发表时间：
2013
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通讯作者：
R. Romano
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作者：
R. Romano
本文件对关于统一国际金融监管的效力的普遍看法提出质疑，并提供了一种机制，以促进监管多样性和在现有全球监管框架内进行试验。巴塞尔协议。最近的经验表明，统一监管可能会增加而不是减少系统性风险。监管失误促使世界各地的金融机构遵循大致相似的业务战略，从而促成了全球金融危机。此外，金融市场的快速变化和动态性质使监管机构不可能有信心地预测什么样的最佳资本要求或其他监管政策是减少系统性风险的，这是全球协调努力的目标，也不可能预测未来的金融创新、活动或机构可能产生系统性风险。因此，该文件认为，增加国际金融监管架构的灵活性，作为减少系统性风险的一种手段，将产生附加值，它建议通过创建一个程序机制，允许沿着多个方面偏离巴塞尔，同时提供保障，使巴塞尔架构更具适应性，因为我们确实拥有的知识有限，防止这种偏离导致系统性风险的加剧。该提案的核心是对拟议偏离巴塞尔的规定进行同行审查，并在批准后持续监测其对全球系统性风险的影响。如果发现偏离会增加系统性风险，将不允许。这一机制将提高监管决策的质量，因为它提供了关于在何种情况下何种监管最有效的信息，并提供了一个安全阀，防止协调一致的监管错误增加系统性风险，减少了世界各地的国际银行在应对监管激励措施时采取大致类似的有缺陷战略的可能性。
This paper challenges the prevailing view of the efficacy of harmonization of international financial regulation and provides a mechanism for facilitating regulatory diversity and experimentation within the existing global regulatory framework. the Basel accords. Recent experience suggests that regulatory harmonization can increase, rather than decrease, systemic risk. By incentivizing financial institutions worldwide to follow broadly similar business strategies, regulatory error contributed to a global financial crisis. Furthermore, the fast-moving, dynamic nature of financial markets renders it improbable that regulators will be able to predict with confidence what optimal capital requirements or other regulatory policies are to reduce systemic risk, the objective of global harmonization efforts, nor what future financial innovations, activities or institutions might generate systemic risk. The paper contends, accordingly, that there would be value added from increasing the flexibility of the international financial regulatory architecture, as a means of reducing systemic risk, It proposes making the Basel architecture more adaptable by creating a procedural mechanism by which departures along multiple dimensions from Basel would be permitted while providing safeguards, given the limited knowledge that we do possess, against the ratchetting up of systemic risk from such departures. The core of the proposal is peer review of proposed departures from Basel, and upon approval, ongoing monitoring for their impact on global systemic risk. If a departure were found to increase systemic risk, it would be disallowed. Such a mechanism would improve the quality of regulatory decisionmaking by generating information on what regulation works best under what circumstances, and by providing a safety valve against a harmonized regulatory error’s increasing systemic risk, by reducing the likelihood that international banks worldwide will follow broadly similar flawed strategies in response to regulatory incentives.