Dynamic Game of International Pollution Control with General Oligopolistic Equilibrium: Neary Meets Dockner and Long
Dynamic Game of International Pollution Control with General Oligopolistic Equilibrium: Neary Meets Dockner and Long
复制标题
一般寡头均衡的国际污染控制动态博弈：尼里遇见多克纳和朗
DOI：
10.1007/s13235-022-00434-2
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发表时间：
2022
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Kamei Keita
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yanase Akihiko;Kamei Keita
本文建立了一个具有污染产业和寡头产业的跨界污染控制的两国差分博弈模型。政府选择污染许可的路径，其市场出清价格由内生性决定，就像在一般的寡头垄断均衡模型中一样。我们考虑了污染商品的自给和双边自由贸易，并在国际合作、开环纳什均衡和线性马尔可夫-完美纳什均衡下分别给出了解决方案。在自给条件下，我们得到了与文献相似的结果；即国际合作的污染最小，线性马尔可夫完美纳什均衡的污染高于开环纳什均衡。在自由贸易条件下，一国的福利取决于两国的排放量，如果贸易是无摩擦的，那么通过国际合作、开环纳什均衡和线性马尔可夫完美纳什均衡都可以实现相同的解决方案。此外，当所有行业的企业数量相同且贸易无摩擦时，自由贸易比闭关自守更有利于环境。然而，如果存在贸易成本，国际贸易可能导致比自给自足更高的污染。
This study develops a two-country differential game model of transboundary pollution control with a continuum of polluting and oligopolistic industries. Governments choose the paths of their pollution permits, the market-clearing prices of which are determined endogenously, as in a general oligopolistic equilibrium model. We consider both autarky and bilateral free trade of polluting goods and derive solutions under international cooperation, open-loop Nash equilibrium, and linear Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium in each regime. Under autarky, we obtain similar results to those in the literature; that is, international cooperation achieves the least pollution, and the linear Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium results in higher pollution than the open-loop Nash equilibrium. Under free trade, each country’s welfare depends on the emissions of both countries, and if trade is frictionless, the same solution can be achieved by international cooperation, the open-loop Nash equilibrium, and the linear Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. Moreover, when all industries have the same number of firms and trade is frictionless, free trade is better for the environment than autarky. However, if trade costs exist, international trade may result in higher pollution than autarky.